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THINGS THAT BELIEVE AND HOW TO GET RID OF THEM: 
Towards a Material Ecology of the Numinous in Japan  
 
Fabio R. Gygi, SOAS University of London 
 
Introduction: Object(s) of Belief 
 
What is the relationship between religious objects and beliefs, between the materiality of 
things and the immaterial idea? There are, broadly speaking, two ways of approaching this question in 
the anthropology of religion. Either religious objects are understood as expressions of cognitively held 
beliefs – or, conversely, belief emerges as the result of practices involving religious objects. 
For the former to work, several conceptual accommodations are required. For example: to 
treat religious objects as mere ‘expressions’ of belief is part of the Protestant strategy to 
decontaminate matter from its more ‘contagious’ Catholic forms, in which the sacred can appear in 
the material shape of relics. Objects of belief are therefore based on a belief in objects. Webb Keane 
calls this “semiotic ideology,” a system of assumptions that define what counts as real presence and 
what counts as sign (2005). These semiotic ideologies are there to create stable links between the 
signifier and the signified, between the material and the numinous world. In spite of this, such 
settlements are rarely stable: things always exceed their own signification (Nakamura 2008). 
The second approach, concerned with the material and bodily practices of believers rather 
than with cognitive content, has been particularly fruitful in the study of Japanese religions, where the 
notion of belief has long been a thorny issue, especially in post-war anthropology (Isomae 2012; 
Fitzgerald 2003). This shift in focus allows the circumvention of ‘belief’ as core concept in the 
analysis of indigenous practice, addressing instead “the conditions that shape the feelings, senses, 
spaces, and performances of belief, that is, the material coordinates or forms of religious practice” 
(Morgan 2010: 6). Such a refocusing not only brings matter back into the fold, it also re-centres the 
study of religion on practice: 
 
Rematerializing the study of religion from its long-term commitment to 
scripture and theology means returning texts to their con-texts of objects, 
images, and spaces wherein texts are found and used. There we also find, 
animating this whole magnificent panoply of things, the actual people who 
produce objects and then render them dynamic in practice. (Zito 2011: 20) 
 
Religious objects, then, become things to believe with, material entities through which belief 
is created and performed – as opposed to the more Protestant view that ritual enacts beliefs that are 
already cognitively held (Bachnik 1995).  
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But what happens to such objects when they are not used, enacted, or part of a performance? 
If the tenets of practice theory are strictly applied, would they then not cease to be religious objects? 
This paper explores what happens to ‘religious’ objects when they are simply left to their own devices 
in Japanese households.1 I am following the trail of Fabio Rambelli who cogently argues that ‘being a 
Buddhist’ in Japan means foremost that one handles Buddhist objects (2007: 2). My contention is that, 
rather than describing these household items as objects of belief, or evidence of belief in objects, or 
objects to believe with, we can more accurately understand them as objects that believe. By this I do 
not mean that they are animated entities with agency and subjectivity, but that they allow for an 
externalization of cognitive belief altogether.  
Methodologically, my argument is based on the attempt to reverse engineer a theory of 
‘religious’ materiality, not from doctrinal notions and disputes, but from the vantage point of disposal. 
What notion of materiality emerges from such a shift in perspective? What is stuck in matter, that 
makes it so difficult to dispose of? And why do concerns with orthopraxy return as soon as it comes 
to getting rid of things? Disposal in this context is like an ethno-methodological experiment: what the 
thing was or meant (or what it is) is only revealed in a moment of crisis, when the existence of the 
thing is threatened. The method I am proposing here is therefore a kind of ‘negative ethnography,’ in 
two distinct senses: first, because it is based on removing the things that one wants to understand and 
therefore eliminating the phenomenon under inquiry and, second, because it is based on that which is 
not voiced or articulated. 
The fieldwork data stems from a larger project dealing with hoarding in a Japanese context, 
from an intensive eighteen months period of fieldwork in Tokyo (2006/2007) and more intermittent 
bursts of fieldwork from 2010 to 2013, when I was working in the Kansai area. The first period 
consisted mainly of helping people to tidy up and get rid of accumulated stuff (see Gygi 2011); the 
second, while continuing with collaborative clean-ups, was more focussed on understanding the 
pathways to disposal (Gygi 2018). There was no particular focus on religious paraphernalia, so the 
data presented here is a side effect of understanding the processes of disposal, a ‘waste product’ so to 
speak. My interest in memorial rites for things was triggered by the desire of my informants to find a 
mechanism for what Ikeuchi calls “voluntary loss” (jihatsuteki sōshitsu 自発的喪失, 2010: 169).  
A focus on the process of disposal, during which an object is moved into the category of ‘no 
longer useful’, is particularly interesting in the context of ‘sacred’ objects, because of the widespread 
assumption that sacred objects become inalienable and therefore “terminal commodities” (Kopytoff 
1986: 75), that is, objects that can no longer be exchanged further. Memorial rites for objects during 
which the objects were destroyed were one way to protect the terminal commodity status. However, 
in my own fieldwork this was not always the case: much of the emotional ambiguity my informants 
felt was informed by the possibility of alienating inalienable things. This mostly applied to objects 
that were created to be enduring presences in people’s lives, such as dolls. The other category of 
ephemeral sacred objects such as talismans and amulets (see below) was expected to circulate 
between the temporary owner and the institution that issued them – a shrine or a temple – on a yearly 
basis, therefore creating an enduring exchange relationship. As material traces of the power of the 
entity the talismans participate in, they have to be renewed and redistributed, leading to spiritual 
prosperity on the side of the supplicant and economic prosperity on the side of the institution. At least 
                                                     
1 I am grateful to the editors of this special volume, Caroline Hirasawa and Loma Benedetta Lomi, who have 
kindly invited me to participate in this project, as an anthropological sheep among religious wolves, so to speak. 
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this is what a description of the ‘religious’ system would look like from the perspective of exchange 
theory.  
The concerns of my informants, however, did not map neatly on to these processes of 
exchange, nor did they match with ideas of the talisman as distributed sacred power. What struck me 
during my fieldwork was the difference between the forgotten, ‘unperformed’ object whose presence 
is not imbued with any significance and the same object that on the brink of disposal suddenly 
becomes ‘sticky’2. My argument is that this only seems contradictory if we assume objects to be 
expressions of beliefs that are otherwise held cognitively. To conceptualise these objects as 
‘embodiments of sacred power’ is to map both the spiritual and material connection between the 
objects and the numinous entity they represent, from the entity’s point of view. The objects therefore 
appear as the literal ‘body’ (bunshin, 分身) of the kami 神 or hotoke 仏. By contrast, my hypothesis is 
that we can gain a better understanding of these objects and their place in people’s everyday lives if 
we think of them less as embodiments of sacred power, but rather as bunshin that believe in place of 
the person who owns them. By conceptualising these objects as body substitutes for the believer 
rather than the believed-in, we can thereby think through the semiotic believer-divinity link from the 
position of the person, rather than the divine. 
Recent academic work on semiotics in Buddhism has mostly focused on the material and 
semiotic links between the unconditioned Buddha nature and its representation (Rambelli 2013).  
Ironically, this focus on doctrine and concept has left the relationship between these sign-objects and 
their owners to the more literal-minded sociologists of religion; much of the religious studies research 
on Japan is informed by the particular semiotic ideology of sociological research in which religious 
objects become readable as expressions of religious belief (Anderson 1991). But what if we posit a 
different relationship between external/material objects and internal/cognitive beliefs? In other words, 
what if, rather than a relationship of representation in which what is inside corresponds to what is 
outside and vice-versa, we assume that the underlying relationship is one of substitution? I am 
inspired to argue this by Takie Sugiyama’s insight into the cultural idiom of migawari 身代わり, 
which can be translated as either ‘body substitution’ or ‘body surrogacy’: 
 
In interviewing a woman in her sixties I found her firmly dedicated to a 
Shinto sect3 without being a member of it. It turned out that her action had 
nothing to do with her own faith but was a surrogate devotion for the sake of 
her deceased mother, who had been a devout member. She missed her mother 
deeply and became a religious successor without, however, losing her 
nonreligious identity. (1994: 109f) 
 
In this case, the surrogacy is not just a question of social role, but can express another 
person’s faith or sincerity. The supplicant does not pray for others, but instead of them, a common 
practice at Shinto shrines. While the idiom of migawari allows for persons to be substituted by others, 
these others must not necessarily be human. ‘Body substitution’ with material surrogates is also an 
                                                     
2 I do not argue here that this is a better understanding of materiality in a Japanese context than an account based 
on doctrinal exegesis. Rather than to assume a culturally specific understanding of materiality, my argument is 
that from the vantage point of disposal, the materiality of religious objects appears as a particular formation. 
3 The reference here is to the Gedatsu-kai 解脱会, new religious movement founded in 1929 that incorporates 
Shinto and Shingon Buddhism elements. 
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important way to safely communicate with the divine. The body substitute enables the contact by 
being exposed to the presence of the deity, but the honnin (literally ‘original person’, meaning the 
person who is doubled by the migawari) remains protected from the forces thus unleashed (Law 
2014). The doubling of the body that allowed impurities to be removed and contained is one of the 
enduring models for rites of purification which consist of a complex intermingling of Shinto, Daoist, 
and Buddhist beliefs (Yamagami 1970). In early modern Japan, migawari talismans emerged as a 
popular form of material culture that would protect the person by offering a double, to which negative 
forces could attach themselves (Bond 2014). I shall argue that in post-war Japan, building on 
traditional practices, questions of religious belief more broadly have been dealt with in an analogous 
manner. In other words, what if we don't assume that the sign instantiates a presence of that which is 
absent, but instead that it allows the distancing creation of absence of that which is otherwise too 
closely present?   
If belief is usually understood as a vertical relationship between an immanent material object 
and a transcendental idea held as a cognitive disposition, then the approach taken here is more 
horizontal: the nature and the content of beliefs changes as a function of ‘distance’ from the religious 
center from which power emanates. The material objects serve as vehicles whose geographical 
distribution mark the reach of a religious institution. Following this idea, I will first look at how 
materiality is understood at Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines and then at the ways in which certain 
objects have been dealt with in ethnographic writing on Japan. After that I will present three 
ethnographic vignettes from my own fieldwork dealing with the more or less ephemeral sacred and 
how to get rid of it.   
 
 
Materiality in Buddhism and Shinto: Bunshin versus Migawari 
 
While a detailed understanding of Buddhist and Shinto notions of materiality is important to 
understand objects and their presence in a Japanese context, these are formulated from the point of 
view of religious institutions or even from the point of view of the entities that are enshrined 
themselves. Rambelli, for example, argues that the Buddhist ambivalence towards the material world 
is a result of the different answers that can be given to the question of the scope of the dharma (2001). 
In other words, to what degree does Buddha nature penetrate the cosmos? Does it extend only to 
sentient beings, or do non-sentient entities such as plants and rocks have the same potential for 
enlightenment? Rambelli describes the complex chains of transformations that shape Buddhist 
materiality:  
   
The idea that material donations […] to religious institutions and their members (the 
sangha) would generate spiritual benefits is crucial [to] Buddhist materiality because 
it means that material objects can be transfigured through ritual action into sacred 
entities […]. This circular transformation of the material into the spiritual and the 
profane into the sacred and back forms the basis of the sacred Buddhist economy, in 
which a community of renunciants survived […] thanks to laypeople’s donations in 
exchange for ‘spiritual’ services. (2007: 68) 
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While objects and services are exchanged in a circle of transmutation, Buddhist icons exist at 
the boundary of the ontological registers of the conditioned/unconditioned Buddha-nature and 
therefore can be seen as real presences in the world (Faure 1998). They make the power of the sacred 
visible, tangible, and material and that is also what renders them vulnerable to iconoclasm in times of 
changing regimes of values (Reinders 2012).  
In Shinto on the other hand, the kami (deities) were worshipped in shrines that served as 
temporary. They would have to be invited and hosted in yorishiro 依り代, particular objects that can 
be man-made (a mirror, or a folded piece of paper) or natural (a large tree, or a rock, or another scenic 
element of nature). It was only after Buddhist monasteries started changing the religious landscape in 
the sixth century CE that shrines become permanent structures to provide housing for the deities (who 
still require enticement to manifest). However, once settlement has been achieved mobility becomes a 
major concern for both Buddhism and Shinto. Once the distinction between ‘sacred’ and ‘secular’ 
spaces gains traction, the sacred needs to be mobile to extend its reach. This is evident in Shinto 
shrine festivals during which the deities are translated into portable shrines and are carried into the 
communities of worshippers to protect and bestow merit. Although some argue that Shinto does not 
have the independent doctrinal apparatus to make it into a ‘religion’ in the strict sense, different 
branches started to spread around Japan with the development of the road network and pilgrimages, 
an early form of tourism. Portable sacred objects that could be installed in shrine branches in other 
places in Japan necessitated a more technical understanding of their relationship to the original sacred 
entity and its embodiment (Sugahara 1996).  
In her ethnography of Inari worship, Karen Smyers argues that the Inari cult spread across 
Japan because its main centers of worship allowed the spiritual essence of the Inari deity to be 
apportioned:  
 
Inari has been divided and re-enshrined with far greater ease and frequency than other 
Shinto kami, and this may in part account for its great diversity. In this division the 
original kami remains in place in his shrine, but a portion of his spirit (wakemitama, 
bunrei 分霊) is ritually separated and enshrined in a new location. The technical term 
for this re-enshrinement is kanjō 勧請. Priests explain it as something akin to lighting 
a new candle from a burning one: the light of the first is in no way diminished as it 
becomes two. (Smyers 1996: 89) 
 
The wakemitama 分け御魂 is a portion of the deity itself and therefore considered to be alive 
in its new abode. This suggests a fractal relationship to the original kami in which the part contains 
the whole, as opposed to being a piece of a greater whole.4  
 A similar relationship between a numinous entity and its material trace obtains in the term 
bunshin 分身, literally ‘divided body’. Reader translates it as ‘offshoot’ (1991: 177) of either kami or 
hotoke. Different from the relics in Catholicism that work in a pars pro toto logic, where the notion of 
sacred power is based on the finite body of the Saint and their personal objects, bunshin created from 
the deity do not diminish the power of the deity, but distribute it in material form. The power of the 
                                                     
4 Smyers points out that kanjō is originally a Buddhist term that meant ‘to request a sermon from Buddha with a  
sincere heart’ and later ‘to call Buddhas to descend to an altar’. In Japan’s syncretistic climate the term came to 
mean ‘to enshrine a kami or a Buddha for the first time’. 
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entity (whether Buddhist or Shinto does matter very little to the worshipper who seeks assistance) can 
be acquired through buying o-fuda お札(amulets) or o-mamori お守り(talismans). These talismans 
are usually made from a piece of wood or paper inscribed with the name of the deity or a short 
invocation, put into a brocade pouch which again bears an inscription of the place of origin and the 
efficacy of the talisman (traffic safety, examination success, convalescence from illness are common 
themes). The inner contents of the talisman remain hidden and one is not supposed to open it, lest the 
efficacy is undermined: 
 
The person who acquires them, then, does not receive a piece of wood or paper but a 
charged concretisation of power, the essence not simply of the kami or Buddha’s 
power and compassion but of the entity itself. Thus they, the kami and Buddhas, may 
be carried with one or kept in the home or elsewhere to bring in good fortune, ward 
off spiritual impediments and absorb bad luck that otherwise would afflict the person 
concerned. Unlike statues, however, their power and efficacy are transient: having 
absorbed bad luck or having opened the way to good, they may need to be changed. 
The general custom (encouraged by shrines and temples, for whom the sale of 
amulets and the like can be an important element in their economies) is to change 
them yearly, with the major period of exchange being at New Year […]. (Reader 
1991b: 178) 
 
In contrast to the material connection to a numinous entity that has to be renewed and 
replaced to remain efficacious, the notion of bunshin has also been used to refer to fractal 
relationships of a different kind.5 In the theology of the new religion Yamakage-Shintō for example, 
human beings are understood to contain bunrei 分霊 of deities within their bodies (Yamakage 2010). 
Sugiyama, on the other hand, argues that the relationship between mother and child can also be 
understood as a bunshin relationship, in which the mother’s sense of self and her purpose in life 
(ikigai 生き甲斐) is felt as ‘being one’ with her child: 
 
We might look at the instances of divorce avoidance not only from the 
standpoint of the child’s welfare but also from the view of the child as 
bunshin (split part) of the mother’s body, in light of the mother’s feeling of 
inseparability. (Sugiyama 1984: 163)  
 
 Tanaka Senichi uses the term bunshin to refer to the relationship between an artisan and their 
instruments: dōgu 道具 that have been used with affection for many years become one with the 
artisan’s body (hito to dōgu wa ittai ni natteiru 人と道具は一体になっている). They are therefore 
treated differently from other objects of everyday use (Tanaka 1987: 8). In the case of both the mother 
and the artisan, what is described as bunshin is an extension of the ‘original’ body from the point of 
view of the subject. 
There is a further category of smaller objects that complicate the picture even further, the 
                                                     
5 Nakamura and Hisao for example translate it somewhat idiosyncratically as ‘alter-ego’ in the context of 
fandom and identification with actors in the Takarazuka theatre (2003). 
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broad and somewhat vague engimono 縁起物.6 Engimono are auspicious objects that are both 
decorative and symbolic, sometimes taking the form of miniatures, sometimes that of toys or zodiac 
animals (for an in-depth etymology of the term engi see Kyburz 1991). They are sometimes 
associated with temple and shrine fairs and double as talismans. Indeed, Kyburz seeks to explain them 
by reference to the karmic links they embody, when he translates the word as “material link” (1994: 
8). Their auspicious nature has different sources: sometimes it is an association by homonym, as in 
the example of the frog kaeru, whose Japanese name is homonymous with ‘to return’ 帰る. 
Sometimes it is a metonymic link as is the case with the rake, the motion of which suggests scooping 
up positive benefits. They are usually made from widely available materials such as wood or papier-
maché. The folklorist Komatsu Kazuhiko calls them “seeds of luck” (1998), a fortuitous coinage: the 
luck grows not because of human intervention, but as a result of the autonomous presence of the 
object. 
 
 
Ethnographic Accounts of the Material Culture of Luck 
 
If we move away from religious centers, explanations in terms of belief weaken considerably. 
Working in the ethnographic mode, Tanabe and Reader provide an explanation in terms of 
psychological well-being, a feeling of safety (anshin 安心) and calm (otonashii 音なし) which is 
only indirectly linked to an actual belief in the efficacy of an entity that is distributed through the 
material object. Rather, the sense of security is created by psychological attributions in which a 
‘traffic safety’ talisman appears as a sign of the driver’s conscientiousness and care for the customers, 
for example. 
The description of explicit cognitive belief and metaphysical speculation has only played a 
minor role in the ethnography of everyday Japanese lives that gained traction in the post-war years. In 
his seminal “Life in a Tokyo Ward,” Ronald Dore has the following to say about the vagueness of 
religious notions in everyday life: “[C]hildren are taught to bow to the kami-sama as they are taught 
to bow to visitors, and they grow up with an idea of the kami-sama as important beings to whom 
deference must be shown without ever receiving explicit instruction concerning the nature, abode or 
function of the kami.” (Dore 1958: 307) 
Contrary to the strict rules of decorum that obtain in the workplace and other formal settings, 
religious expression is an area in which considerable freedom is possible. John Nelson found in his 
ethnographic work at Suwa Jinja in Nagasaki (1996a) and at Kamigamo Jinja in Kyoto (1996b) a 
broad range of possible behaviors, from unorthodox personal forms of prayers to secret night-time 
devotions the groundkeepers complained about. Although many of those he interviewed after a shrine 
visit came away with amulets and talismans, the overwhelming majority were unable to identify the 
deity that they just visited.  
From the perspective of medical anthropology, John Traphagan has described the house altar 
(butsudan), its associated religious paraphernalia, and the rituals that go with them as a “total life care 
system” (2004: 79), and he identifies “religiously oriented ritual practice […] as a type of health and 
well-being management system” (2004: 178) that instead of being directed towards numinous entities 
                                                     
6 As votive plaques are not normally taken home from shrines, I exclude them from discussion here. See 
Robertson 2008 for a historical and Reader 1991a for an ethnographic account. 
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were a practice of concern for those (still) alive.  
Following in this vein, Inge Daniels, working mostly with families in the Kansai area, has 
argued that engimono form part of the “domestic, spiritual defense system” (2010: 98). This 
functionalist perspective (and I do not use functionalist here as a dirty word) is useful to understand 
the kinds of relationship that this particular material culture of luck engenders. However, Daniels is 
not clear about whether this system is her interpretation or whether she attributes it as a form of belief 
to her informants. The engimono in her description do not appear as material traces of the sacred, but 
as objects whose meaning is contained in their shape and their name. After describing the notions of 
luck in some detail, she has this to say:  
 
During my fieldwork, however, it emerged that individual attitudes towards 
engimono may vary greatly. For example, the two Miyada daughters, both unmarried 
and in their late 30s, express contrasting views about the disposal of the luck items 
displayed in their home. Naoko, the younger, said that because these objects are 
linked with temples and shrines they should be handled with great care. Kaori, on the 
other hand, claimed that she does not see any problem in disposing of them in the bin. 
One way to interpret her words is that the commodification of engimono has resulted 
in a kind of inflation effect, whereby the presence of too many engimono in the home 
might have devalued their power. (Daniels 2003: 630) 
 
Daniel’s reference to commodification, however, does not explain why there should be two 
diametrically opposed attitudes to the same category of things in the same family. The idea of 
devaluation also directly contradicts her earlier work on the commodification of rice scoops and how 
this process extends the aura of the place of origin, in this case Itsukushima shrine. Rather, the above 
passage points towards individual differences in attitudes towards and relationships with things.  
 
 
The Comforts of Orthopraxy I 
  
In my own fieldwork with people who had difficulties getting rid of things I found a broad 
range of individual and sometimes idiosyncratic attitudes towards everyday objects. The following 
two ethnographic vignettes illustrate some of the tensions surrounding the disposal of ‘religious’ 
objects, a tension that manifests itself as a desire for orthopraxy.  
Doing fieldwork on person-object relationships by getting rid of the latter required a lot of 
delicate maneuvering: to gain access to people’s private space and handle their possessions I had to be 
careful not to insist too forcefully on disposal, lest this should jeopardize the relationship of trust I 
aimed to establish with my informants. Our aims were so different to begin with: I wanted to find out 
about the objects and they wanted me to help get rid of them, at least when we started in the morning. 
As the day progressed, a particular pattern would often emerge: our aims would start to align in the 
early afternoon, as my informants got closer to the dreaded moment of actual disposal. They soon 
realized that long conversations would stall the process and that they could save objects through 
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narrative binding: once we had explored the meaning of a particular object, I was no longer able to 
say “let’s throw this out” with the same ease. The case of Tomohiro7 illustrates this8: 
After a day of sorting through mountains of stuff and putting as much as possible of it into bin 
bags, we stood in the crisp winter air in front of the apartment door on the fourth floor of a residential 
building in a crowded Tokyo suburb. The sun was about to set and cast a last ray of golden light 
through the high-rise office towers onto twelve bulging bin bags that waited to be taken down to the 
rubbish and recycling area. Tomohiro, who lived in the apartment he and I had spent the last few days 
tidying up, sighed, his breath condensing in the crisp winter air. I knew this was a crucial moment and 
steeled myself for what I suspected would happen, based on the experience of the day before: after 
swift progress during the day, doubts about what we were trying to accomplish started bothering 
Tomohiro, and although we managed to put the bags downstairs, I had noticed the next morning that 
suspiciously familiar magazines, books, and flyers had reappeared overnight. As suspected, I noticed 
that among the “returned” stuff we had decided together to throw out were all the objects I vaguely 
classified in my mind as ‘religious.’ As I did not want to confront him and thus jeopardize our 
working relationship, I thought that this might be a good opportunity to understand something about 
what bound him to these objects. 
However, while the computer magazine of the late 90s led to a prolonged nostalgic 
meditation about how the internet had changed over the last ten years, a little talisman lead to an 
embarrassed silence. After a while Tomohiro said: “Well, you know, we Japanese do not really 
believe in all of this, it’s just custom”. Whatever was bothering Tomohiro, he framed it in terms of 
orthopraxy: if only there were a ‘correct’ way to throw these things away, it would be so much easier. 
The hamaya 破魔矢, a type of lucky arrow he had bought with his girlfriend last year for New Year’s, 
and the kadomatsu 門松 decoration woven from straw and attached to the door were both past their 
normative life cycle of one year and not only could, but should be disposed of. Yet to do so properly 
would require an added effort at identifying the correct pathway of disposal. There was another small 
item that came back two times: a small portable talisman whose brocade surface had been worn down 
to illegibility. Tomohiro could not remember where it came from or how long it had been buried 
under other things. I suggested half-jokingly that maybe we should open it and see what was inside, as 
every other means of identifying it had disappeared. This was first met with an incredulous look, in 
spite of the earlier disavowal of belief. What would happen? Would it bring bad luck? Or incur the 
curse of the unknown deity? Tomohiro just laughed and said, ‘You are the folklorist, you tell me’. 
When I – somewhat frustrated – threatened to open it, he enigmatically replied, ‘It’s better not to 
know what is inside.’ This episode made it into my field diary as an example of the kinds of resistance 
I encountered. It was only much later that an interpretation suggested itself to me.  
                                                     
7 All of my informants’ names are anonymized. 
8 The first vignette is a contraction of several days of fieldwork undertaken in January 2012. 
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The fact that the talisman is thought to work despite – or precisely because of – the owner not 
knowing what it contains is a material concretization of the argument I am trying to make. Although it 
was not doing anything in terms of practice, its presence helped to keep something in place. This 
something was not a particular content of belief, but belief itself. The unwrapping of the talisman 
would have disclosed the problematic nature of belief and required some kind of engagement with it.  
Understanding the relationships people have with their things in terms of substitution instead 
of representation allows us to make sense of the passive, unperformed nature of much religious 
paraphernalia and why they become suddenly relevant at the point of disposal. There is an inversion 
of the usual relationship between utility and function: while something is kept as long as it is used and 
disposed of once the end of usability is reached, the body substitute is active as long as nothing is 
done with it. It is the material presence that renders the presence of a matching cognitive belief 
superfluous. 
There are several distinctions that may lead out of the contradiction between the importance 
of ritual action and the absence of cognitive belief. Ludwig Wittgenstein raised the question of the 
duration of belief: if we believe belief to be a state of mind, the how long does it continue? Is belief 
interrupted by sleep for example? (Wittgenstein 1975, Zettel 85) In anthropology, Needham has 
argued that the idea of belief as propositions about the world that are accepted as true is problematic 
because they are based on an intellectual, universalist model of belief and there is nothing apart from 
utterances that provides us with evidence that a mental state as holding a belief exists (1973). The 
distinction between orthodoxy as the correct way of believing versus orthopraxy – the correct way to 
behave – has been especially influential in the Japanese case (Bachnik 1995; Shields 2010), as it 
allows to disentangle cognitive belief from a broader range of nuances to belief: 
 
Cognitive acceptance of the claims made about the efficacy of ritual is not always 
necessary for the ritual to be efficacious. When pressed with the question of whether 
or not they believe in the ability of an amulet to achieve its stated purpose – curing 
disease, for instance – many people we interviewed deny any belief in such magic. 
(Reader and Tanabe 1998: 127) 
 
In contradistinction, Reader and Tanabe suggest “affective belief” (which aligns with the 
distinction in philosophy of belief as statement and belief as disposition). Critiques such as Anderson 
(1991) and Fitzgerald (2003) have argued that the often-reported absence of belief disqualifies the 
concept of religion from being used in this context altogether. The ethnographer in their view is more 
accurate when speaking of ‘custom’ when talking of buying amulets and talismans, complete with the 
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unreflected automatism that this suggests.9 In a similar vein, Swift (2010) has argued that we may act 
rashly if we dispose of belief itself, only from the assumption that it is something that is inaccessibly 
‘deep,’ that is, buried in people’s minds or their interiors. Swift suggests that cosmologies can be 
superficial: not only concerned with surface by also limited to it. I would add that instead of searching 
for belief in people’s minds, assuming that they are somewhere hidden on the inside, we can find 
them rather hiding in plain sight: that in order to understand the particular religion of modernity we 
need to think of belief as physically distributed in space. This notion also contributes to the problem 
of the duration of belief raised by Wittgenstein. By externalizing the purported state of mind, it 
acquires some of the temporal extension of material objects. Religious paraphernalia in this approach 
do not then express or symbolize belief, but they are the beliefs themselves tout court.  
 
The Comforts of Orthopraxy II 
 
The second vignette addresses the problem of emotional attachment that is sometimes (but by 
no means always) an obstacle when getting rid of personal objects. From my own observations, I 
could see that a sense of attachment played an important role for both my male and female informants. 
Unsurprisingly, however, given the gendered nature of the Japanese language and the gendered 
subjectivities it enforces, my female informants were more vocal about the emotional aspects of 
disposal. One of the challenges when tidying up was to find ways in which the ambiguity between the 
wish to get rid of something and the emotional attachment to it can be given a social form, as 
illustrated below. 
On a sunny and still fairly warm October afternoon in 2012 I visited Fushimi Inari Taisha in 
the south of Kyoto with Noriko, a single woman in her 30s who worked for a small publishing house. 
On a previous visit a year earlier, I had noticed an official disposal place for religious paraphernalia 
on the boundary between the formal shrine buildings and the less regulated backstage of the 
mountains on which different forms of personalized worship were practiced (see Smyers 1993 for a 
description of the site). I had helped Noriko with cleaning up her apartment over the last three months 
in small incremental steps. As somebody with a strong sense of responsibility who constantly worried 
about the wellbeing of things, it was hard for her to get rid of stuff, especially as her friends and 
family would continue to give her more of the things that they themselves wanted to get rid of. Noriko 
was frustrated by this, especially because her parents also exhorted her to be tidier, lest she be 
permanently unable to find a husband. I suggested that we could ‘say goodbye’ to the kawaii 
                                                     
9 The scholar of religion Isomae Jun’ichi (2012) has pointed out that the distinction between religion and 
ritualism was crucial for the establishment of State Shinto. These apparently neutral analytical categories 
therefore need to be deconstructed themselves before they can be uncritically applied to the present day.  
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engimono10 by bringing them to this official place. Although most of the stuff did not originate with 
the Fushimi Inari Taisha, I knew that the Inari deity (in fact three or five distinct entities depending on 
the site of worship) was thought to be tolerant and welcoming to human beings who seek solace of 
some kind. We carried a large cardboard box up the hill and she reluctantly deposited it in the 
designated small building. There was some trepidation when she saw how carelessly some of the o-
mamori had been tossed in, but eventually she carefully put the box in and we stood in silence for a 
moment. I suppressed the desire to root through the kind of things that were disposed, as I had been 
warned on an earlier visit that this was inappropriate (as rooting through people’s garbage is in 
general). I was curious as to how this ‘correct’ (or at least institutionally backed) disposal felt to her, 
but did not want to ask any leading questions. We strolled through the large shrine grounds and when 
we left her mood had visibly brightened: she felt refreshed (sappari shita さっぱりした) and relieved 
(kaihōkan 開放感). This sense of refreshment that many of my informants reported once things were 
gone, had to do with the sense of ‘having done the right thing’ (tadashii sutekata 正しい捨て方) 
rather than with any belief in the entity revered at Fushimi Inari. 
In a subsequent interview Noriko reflected upon her own double bind and said that she did 
not want to refuse things given to her, but nor did she want to pass then on to burden someone else. 
The attachment she felt for the things in her case had to do more with her self-image as a caring and 
trustworthy person than with the particular characteristics of the objects. Even who had given them to 
her was less important than the sense of stewardship that she felt for them. The reason why the 
‘official’ disposal route worked for her was that it allowed for a sense of closure. It was not that she 
later missed the objects or regretted disposing of them, as sometimes happened with other informants. 
Quite the opposite: she took pride in having been the last person to look after them and to have found 
a solution that did not burden anyone else. In that sense they became terminal commodities: the 
objects had to be destroyed in order not to become alienable possessions again. More than anything 
else, it was the finality of this process that gave Noriko peace of mind.11 
 
Dolls and How to Get Rid of Them 
 
 In the introduction, I argued that the notion of ‘body substitution’ as a heuristic device can be 
applied to religious paraphernalia more widely. But there are also cases in which ‘body substitution’ 
can be taken in a much more literal sense. Ichimatsu dolls present an interesting case in point: 
                                                     
10 We used the term engimono loosely to refer to a broad range of things, some of which were marketing 
gimmicks using popular culture characters, key chains and decorative figurines made from plastic, all therefore 
technically not engimono. 
11 This sense of finality is predicated on the fact that we did not know what would happen to the things once 
they were disposed. Some visitors I had talked to on an earlier visit suggested that they would be burned, others 
said burial would be the proper mode of disposal at a Shinto institution. The point is that disposal is enabled by 
willful ignorance. 
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elaborately crafted and originally made with human hair, they are traditionally given to new parents 
by well-off grandparents as a toy, but also to protect the child by offering it a second body, a target for 
everything that is negative: illnesses, bad luck, and more implicitly evil spirits. These practices go 
back all the way to Heian court rituals for purification and childbirth (see Law 1997: 35f). But like the 
body substitution talismans that spread as a commodity for soldiers only during the Russo-Japanese 
war in 1904/05 (Bond 2014), and the bride dolls of Northern Japan that were a phenomenon triggered 
by the Pacific war (Schattscheider 2001; 2005), the view that Ichimatsu dolls function as body 
substitutes seems to be a Meiji and Taisho period development. While an association between 
engimono and toys is evident at least since the medieval times (Kyburz 1991) and migawari beliefs 
are documented in Buddhism and Shinto in a range of different contexts,12 an overlap of these two 
categories only happens once the Ichimatsu doll travels from the Kansai area to the new capital of 
Tokyo, where its original likeness to the Kabuki actor Sanokawa Ichimatsu (1722-62) is only retained 
in the name. The Ichimatsu dolls are a modern development of Edo-period Mitsuore-Ningyō 三つ折
れ人形 (three-jointed puppets) and because they had articulated limbs and could be dressed and made 
to sit and stand independently, they served both as children’s toys and as decorative items (Plate 
2008: 238). 
In “Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan”, first published in 1894, Lafcadio Hearn described the 
Ichimatsu dolls as so life-like that it was sometimes hard to tell the difference between children and 
dolls, and that photographers would often substitute real children with dolls that were easier to handle 
when it came to long exposures (1976: 266).13 The verisimilitude to a living child came from 
innovations in the coloring of the dolls’ faces and hands. While the traditional color was based on a 
white, lustrous pigment made from powdered oyster shells and animal glue called gofun 胡粉, doll 
makers added more gloss (egg-white) and pink to the face of the Ichimatsu dolls. Lifelikeness both in 
terms of size and appearance – but not in resemblance to a particular person – lent them to be 
conceptualized as body substitutes. Western collectors who travelled to Japan bought large quantities 
of them and their lifelikeness inspired fantasies of animation in Western artists (see the Japonism-
inspired paintings of Charles Dater Weldon, reprinted in Pate 2008: 234). As evidenced in the case of 
                                                     
12 A familiar figure in folklore is the body substitute version of the bodhisattva Jizō, the migawari Jizō. This 
benevolent entity is thought to take on suffering and pain by standing in for the body of the supplicant (Yanagita 
1951: 257). This is framed in Buddhist terms as daijuku代受苦, a voluntary taking-on of human pain, one of 
the virtues of the bodhisattva. Some of these stories have their origin in the Konjakumonogatari 今昔物語, 
compiled at the end of the Heian period. The folklorist Miyata Noboru reports another, slightly less benign form 
of body substitution in which a Jizō figure is tied up with ropes by the supplicant to experience the pain that 
they feel. The bound Jizō (shibari Jizō 縛り地蔵) is only released once the relief that is prayed for has taken 
place (1975: 131f). Body substitution in an early Shinto context most likely had the function to protect the 
supplicant from the dangers of an encounter with the untamed nature of the deity (aramitama 荒御魂). 
13 Hitogata 人形 are rudimentary paper shapes that can be rubbed on the body to remove pollution, thus 
functioning through touch. The shift towards transmission through resemblance could arguably have been 
influenced by the introduction of the new medium of photography. If we understand these carefully staged early 
photographs to be simulacra of the real world, then it would only be befitting that the figures in the picture are 
simulacra of human beings.   
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the photographers, the semiotic notion of body substitution is much more flexible than just ‘a 
religious belief.’ Another example of this flexibility is demonstrated by the curious case of the Tōrei-
ningyō 答礼人形 or friendship ambassador dolls in 1927. In 1926 Frederick Starr, an avid doll 
collector, instigated a U.S.-wide doll friendship project that was aimed at creating friendly relations 
between the U.S. and Japan in an increasingly hostile international climate. 12,739 blue-eyed dolls 
collected from all over the U.S. were sent to Japan as a gesture of friendship. Japan responded by 
sending fifty-seven life-sized Ichimatsu dolls representing the provinces of Japan. Each of them came 
with a friendship passport and they were distributed all over the United States to be displayed in 
libraries, museums and schools. In exchange for the children’s toys sent by the Americans, the 
Japanese answer was to send friendship-by-substitution. Enthusiastically received in the beginning, as 
diplomatic relations began to sour the dolls were removed from display. The American dolls in Japan 
were eventually destroyed by imperial edict as harbingers of foreign influence, a treatment that can 
again be understood through the cultural logic of migawari (Pate 2005: 219). 
Interestingly, these dolls are now widely considered to be creepy and scary (Daniels 2009). 
Although they are thought to have considerable value if they have been made by one of the doll 
masters of the early Meiji or Taishō periods14, when I undertook fieldwork on Tokyo’s and Kyoto’s 
flea markets in 2011, I found that they were very hard to sell to fellow Japanese. While such doubts 
were never quite voiced in a specifically ‘religious’ way, a few people I talked to told me that as they 
belonged to strangers it was best to keep away from them, because you never know what happened to 
the person it was originally bought for. Furthermore, one middle-aged woman told me that the 
Ichimatsu dolls start to resemble their owners and that you would not want to have a stranger staring 
at you in your own house (they are usually displayed in glass cases). Conversely, a mother who 
visited the market with her ten-year old daughter said that it was because they resembled a lost, 
stylized ideal of beauty that modern people no longer relate to, which made them look like children 
from the past who never aged.  A male collector of antiques who I briefly talked to at the Setagaya 
boroichi argued that it was the tension between lifelikeness and the eerie immobility that rendered 
them uncanny.15 But the explanation given most often was that they were creepy because they were 
opaque, unknowable.  
If we presume that the body surrogate absorbs everything that does NOT happen to the person 
it substitutes, then the doll becomes more ‘other’ as both child and doll age together. Under the 
increasing verisimilitude, the doll’s ‘content’ becomes a kind of negative inversion of the person. In 
                                                     
14 The first living national treasure in the field of doll making was Hirata Gōyō 平田郷陽 (1903-1981). 
15 Unsurprisingly Ichimatsu dolls feature is several horror films (most explicitly in Kono ko no nanatsu no oiwai 
ni (Shōchiku 1982, written and directed by Masumura Yasuzo) and Shinsei Toire-no-Hanako-san (Tōei 1998, 
directed by Tsutsumi Yukihiko). For the Halloween season in 2016 Universal Studio Japan opened a Japanese 
doll-themed attraction called “Tatari: Curse of the Living Dolls” which drew the ire of the Tokyo Association of 
Toy and Shopkeepers for its negative depiction of the dolls (Japan Times, October 19, 2016). Piquantly, many 
of the dolls were leased to UFJ by Awashima Myōjin in Wakayama, a shrine associated with dolls. 
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other words, the doll becomes a container - both in the meaning of containing and delimiting – for 
everything that the person it was bought for was protected from. These dolls are very difficult to get 
rid of, because breaching the containment risks dispersing whatever is contained. The doll as 
protective form only works, however, as long as the person is alive. The fact that the doll survives the 
person it is doubling renders it doubly uncanny. Although the connection to migawari is rarely voiced, 
the association with death is implicit: the sheer presence of the doll without its owner suggests its 
freedom from the earlier relationship.   
The unease people voiced about these dolls on the flea markets was in some measure 
counterbalanced by an appreciation of their beauty and craftsmanship, but the former outstripped the 
latter by far. Their sense of presence was augmented by an unspoken sense of taboo: what had been 
an inalienable object connected to a particular individual now reentered the market place, looking to 
attach itself to a new owner. When I tried to draw out one seller, a young woman who was working 
for a large antiques shop, on the implications of hosting such an uncanny object, she guardedly said 
“it will certainly change the atmosphere in your house” (interview on 16. January 2016). 
Where does that leave us in terms of a theory of practice? In terms of materiality, there are 
two connected understandings at work: absorbency and containment. As body substitutes absorb bad 
luck, bad intentions, and other kinds of negative energies, their own substance becomes compromised. 
They are not thought to be ‘alive,’ but they become more than mere things. To dispose of them is 
difficult because those negative energies could always escape and return to their owners. It is safer to 
live with them, but the settlement is never an easy one: the contemporary Ichimatsu dolls never 
entirely join the family (as toys for example), they remain aloof in their display cases and are rarely 
touched. If they are stored, their owners make sure that they are comfortable, lest they should feel a 
grudge (Daniels 2009). In other words, they are always treated as guests.  
It is clear then that the function of migawari is linked to both proximity and passivity. It is 
precisely because nothing happens to the object that it can function as a body substitute. As long as 
the trajectory or life course of owner and object align, the relation of substitution works and the 
objects are inalienable (but not necessarily held to be important: quite the opposite, they can be 
forgotten). The moment that this alignment ceases, things start to light up (in Heidegger’s 
terminology), that is, in the case of the death of the owner or the disposal of the object.  
 
Rites of Disposal 
 
When I first visited the monthly Kitano-Tenmangu market in Kyoto16 to find out about beliefs 
about materials I was often told that whatever is stuck in matter owned by someone else – and this 
could be articulated as dirt, pollution, a curse, or unspecified bacteria depending on the person I talked 
                                                     
16 First monthly from October to December 1999, then on a less regular basis from 2010 to 2013. 
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to – would not affect me as I was foreign.17 A similar discourse was in evidence regarding dolls, 
specifically the larger Ichimatsu dolls in and out of glass cases. Foreign tourists were considered to be 
the best buyers for them, as they would then be taken away to a place where they could do no harm. 
In other words, removing the dolls from Japan to where they would be valued as souvenirs and 
mementos, would interrupt the connection to individual persons and turn the doll into a more general 
representation of Japan. A similar thing happened to Karen Smyers during her fieldwork at the 
Fushimi Inari Taisha mentioned earlier. The shrine was committed to burying the discarded statues of 
foxes that are associated with the Inari deity, but soon ran out of space (especially as the mountain 
behind the shrine is - contrary to public perception - not owned by the shrine). When she showed an 
interest in the material culture of Inari worship, the shrine was more than happy to ‘dispose’ of an 
unwanted surplus of what often had been private devotional statues and objects by donating them to 
what was to become the Inari collection in the Kenneth Starr library at Columbia university.18 
But to get rid of something by sending it abroad is not always a possibility and memorial 
services for dolls, ningyō kuyō人形供養, have seen a remarkable increase in popularity over the last 
fourty years. This is part of a boom in all sort of ‘memorial services,’ especially for pets (Ambros 
2012) and aborted fetuses (for example Hoshino and Takeda 1987; Anderson and Martin 1997). 
Inanimate objects, too, are ritually disposed of, usually sponsored by the local association of trade and 
manufacture involved with the production of the thing in question (see Kretschmer 2000 for needles 
and glasses, Ōsaki 1995 for dolls and Ōsaki 1997 for scissors). Memorial services for inanimate 
objects, despite indication that some already existed in the Edo-period, are a recent innovation. The 
Tokyo Association of Toy and Doll Shopkeepers only started sponsoring a ‘memorial service for dolls’ 
in 1958. Rambelli argues that the meaning of leaving dolls at a temple has changed considerably and 
that what originally may have been a sacrificial prestation has become a way of getting rid of 
unwanted objects (2007: 215). The folklorist Tanaka Senichi on the other hand maintains that 
memorial services for inanimate things hark back to ancient folk beliefs about the animate nature of 
things: 
 
The expression of gratitude is only the superficial reason; I argue that in 
reality, it is the wish to dispel a sense of unease and gain a sense of security19 
that motivates memorial services. Is this sense of unease […] not a latent 
                                                     
17 Such assertions usually took two forms: either they were formulated with reference to the sturdier bodies of 
foreigners as compared to the more susceptible constitution of the Japanese, or they were expressed in terms of 
belief: “Where you come from there surely is no such belief, therefore it cannot affect you.” 
18 http://library.columbia.edu/news/libraries/2009/20090604_inari.html (pers. comm. Max Moermann) 
19 hikkakaru kimochi wo fusshoku shite anshin wo ete okitai ひっかかる気持ちを払拭して安心を得ておき
たい(All translations from Japanese are my own). 
 17 
fear20 that the some kind of spirit of the thing that is thrown away could cause 
misfortune? […] We can therefore say that memorial services are undertaken 
to prevent the activation of the spirit through its extraction from the 
instrument.21 By removing the spirit and turning the instrument into just a 
thing, it can disposed of calmly.22 (Tanaka 1987: 7-8) 
 
While this makes sense in conceptual and emotional terms, my informants never spoke of 
objects as possessed or inhabited by spirits. While emotional attachment clearly plays an important 
role, this is rarely if ever expressed as explicit belief that the object is imbued with life. It also does 
not explain why these memorial services are increasing in popularity while folk Shinto beliefs are on 
the decline. The social psychologist Ikeuchi Hiromi undertook a survey of people who participated in 
a memorial service for dolls at the Mondo Yakujin Tōkōji門戸厄神東光寺 in Nishinomiya (Kobe) in 
2007 and found to her surprise that it was the younger generation who scored significantly higher on 
the animism scale アニミズム尺度 (2010). She explains this as the influence of popular culture such 
as TV programmes (both infotainment and anime) that feature all kinds of magic and New Age 
spirituality. 
An emphasis on economic rather than religious explanations is also apparent in contemporary 
folklore studies. In his work on the rites of disposal for shoes, the folklorist Matsuzaki Kenzō for 
example links memorial services for inanimate things specifically to creating smooth circles of 
production and consumption and to organizing solidarity among competitors in the same profession 
(1996).  
Like other memorial services for inanimate objects, doll memorial services are known by a 
range of names, ningyō kuyō being perhaps the most traditional term, modeled on Buddhist funerary 
rites that are meant to transform the deceased into an enlightened entity. The Meta-jinja 賣太神社 in 
Nara calls it ningyō-shōtensai 人形昇天祭, literally ‘doll ascension festival.’ This annual occasion, 
held on May 5, Children’s Day, involves the reading of noritō 祝詞 prayers and the actual burning of 
all kinds of dolls, which are said to ascend to heaven as deities. It is the purifying agency of fire in 
these various rites that expresses the inalienable nature of the doll as migawari. Whatever is contained 
is erased or transformed in the process leaving nothing behind. 
Other recent ceremonial innovations are much brighter in tone and part of a secular ethos of 
recycling and gratitude to be inculcated in children. In these cases, usually organized by local 
                                                     
20 sono mama suteta no dewa rei no wazawai ga shōjiru dewa nai ka to iu senzai-teki ifukan そのまま捨てた
のでは霊の災いが生じるのではないかという潜在的畏怖感 
21Dōgu no shōki-nuki, shone-nuki, tama-nuki no tame, sunawachi komoru rei wo nuki-totte sono hatsudō wo 
mizen ni fusegō to shite okonawareru  道具の正気抜き・性根抜き・魂抜きのため、すなわち籠る霊を抜
き取ってその発動を未然に防ごうとして行われる 
22Rei wo nuite tan-naru mono ni shite霊を抜いて単なるモノにして 
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business associations in cooperation with schools, the occasion is called a ‘festival of gratitude’ or 
kansha-sai 感謝祭, which removes it from a more religious institutional frame. A monk is still invited 
to read the Heart Sutra to the assembled stuffed animals and dolls, but more emphasis is put on the 
participatory element.23 Some temples, such as the Jōganji 成願寺 in Matsuyama on Shikoku, allow 
participants to throw their dolls onto the pyre themselves, which creates a more festival-like 
atmosphere, also helped by the summer date of their ceremony.24 
While the burning of the dolls is an integral part of the rite as kuyō, this is often no longer 
possible after temples began accepting a much broader range of items beyond the traditional dolls 
made from wood, silk, and papier-mâché. Stuffed animals and plastic dolls are particularly 
problematic and many temples that used to burn the dolls, such as the famous Shōryakuji 正暦寺 in 
Nara prefecture, now use the services of specialist disposal companies. While Shōryakuji25 receives 
dolls to dispose of throughout the year, the big ceremony called daigoma kuyō大護摩供養 takes 
place on March 9. For each individual box of dolls received by post a brief service is held on the day 
of arrival, but on March 9, the dolls are put on the altar of the sub-temple Fukuju-in 福寿院 and a 
special service is performed.26 When I observed the ritual in 2012, there were about hundred people in 
attendance. The sound of the conch shell marks the start of the ceremony at 14:00. Gagaku music is 
performed by the monks, followed by recitations of Buddhist scriptures, mainly the Heart Sutra 
Hannya Shingyō 般若心経. The visitors can then step forward and light incense in front of the dolls. 
After about thirty minutes, the priests line up and leave the main hall to where a smaller altar with 
representative dolls is set up in front of the wooden pyre, covered with green branches. In 2012, the 
center piece was a warrior doll (musha-ningyō 武者人形) surrounded by five decorative isho-Ningyō 
衣裳人形 dolls on the upper level of the shelf, five Western style dolls in elaborate baroque dresses 
under them, four Ichimatsu dolls (one boy and four girls), one seated hina-ningyō 雛人形, and a 
stuffed Miffy and Winnie the Pooh on either end of the shelf. 
The pyre is ceremoniously lit from an eternal light with a large bamboo torch. At first this 
creates a dense grey smoke, which slowly gives way to flames while the monks continue to chant the 
Heart Sutra. Only then do they start to throw the wooden sacrificial sticks (goma 護摩) that had been 
collected over the year into the fire, where they burn in the presence of the dolls and those who came 
especially today to bring dolls and to witness the ceremony.  
                                                     
23 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lPhBowg1Kpw, accessed November 20, 2017 
24 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1sn4ar-0wUo, accessed November 21, 2017 
25 Founded in 992, the Shōryakuji is the main temple of the Bodaisen Shingon 菩提山真言 sect. The main hall 
contains a rare Asuka-period bronze statue of Yakushi Nyōrai, depicted sitting down, with both feet on a lotus 
flower. 
26 The service in 2012 cost five-thousand yen for a cardboard box of fifty centimeters or a plastic bag of approx. 
45 liters. 
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What is burnt, however, is no longer the dolls, but a further substitution: the participants are 
asked to write their names on the goma sticks which are then burnt in the presence of the dolls. 
Tanaka Masaru (2005) argues that this substitution was forced by the ministry of the environment’s 
reduction of dioxin policy. But as an unintended consequence of this environmental concern, another 
interpretation becomes possible, in which the compromised nature of the doll’s materiality manifests 
itself in a different form: on one side as indestructible toxic matter in the case of dolls and stuffed 
animals made from plastic; on the other as embodiment of considerable value in the case of the 
antique dolls. Both forms resist destruction by fire and therefore the severing of the ties to their 
former owners. Because of this, the modern form of the rite appears as inversion of the older: Instead 
of burning the dolls in the presence of their former owners, the names of the owners, written on to the 
goma, are burnt in the presence of the dolls. Seen from that perspective, what is severed is the 
attachment that the dolls have to their owners, who, after all, have already decided to dispose of them. 
By burning their names, the link between subject and object is destroyed: the dolls relinquish their 
existence as possessions and return to a neutral commodity form. This suggests the possibility that the 
dolls would not be finally destroyed but sold or passed on by the disposal companies. I have not been 
able to verify this so far, as the psychological efficacy of the rite depends precisely on the fact that the 
attendants do not know what happens to the dolls. The monks were understandably reluctant to shed 
any light on the onwards trajectory of the dolls.   
At the end of the ceremony, while the fire was still smoldering, the abbot gave a short speech 
thanking the visitors and the dolls, “that have taught us serenity and gentleness.”27 It was difficult to 
interview informants who took part in the rite without disturbing the smooth flow of events, especially 
since questions as to the nature of the attachment of the dolls and where people thought they were 
going could disturb the sense of closure that people came to achieve in an officially sanctioned way. I 
was able to speak to several people who gave a range of individual interpretations. One middle-aged 
local woman who brought her dolls to the service had recently lost her mother and was fairly 
business-like about the whole affair. She did not want to keep these traditional dolls in her modern, 
Western-style house. When I asked her why she did not just throw them away, she simply answered 
that they had come to the end of their utility28 and that this was the correct, official way to end it. 
Another woman in her 60s said after some trepidation that she did not want to leave them to her 
children, because they may not want them. For her, the memorial service was an expression of 
gratitude, but also a way to alleviate her guilt (zaiakukan罪悪感) about disposing of something that 
could still be used.  
The recent popularity of memorial services represents an increasing desire for an orthopraxis 
of disposal for problematic materialities. For many people who are using those services, they provide 
                                                     
27 Yasuragi to yasashisa wo oshiete-kureta ningyō ni kansha shimasu 安らぎと優しさ教えてくれた人形に感
謝します 
28 O-ningyō no yakume ha kore de owattaお人形の役目はこれで終わった 
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the comfort of an officially sanctioned way of getting rid of unwanted objects, which conveys a sense 
of closure instead a sense of guilt. On the side of temples who seek to extend their business beyond 
the funeral industry (Suzuki 2002), it is an investment that connects financial gain with pastoral care 
in new and innovative ways. 
 
 
CONCLUSION: Things that Believe 
 
Looking at things from the point of view of disposal, two particular formations of materiality 
emerge: the circulating minor material culture of belief which seems to do nothing in particular until 
its disposal, which I argue allows for an externalization of the problem of belief. The other is matter 
that requires more careful disposal as the substance itself is understood to be compromised. This 
understanding can take different, sometimes overlapping forms: from the notion that matter – either 
through its material qualities in the case of paper or through resemblance in the case of dolls – can 
absorb and contain misfortune and unspecified negative energies, to concerns that burning such things 
releases toxins into the environment.  
In both cases, the material presence is crucial in bringing out the meanings these things are 
imbued with. While my informants would sometimes go as far as to ridicule the notion that one could 
believe in the powers of charms and talismans, they would still be reluctant to discard them. What the 
material presence of these objects enabled was not a psychological projection of interior belief onto 
the external world, but rather the ability to externalize the problem of belief – to hold it, literally, an 
arm’s length away. Making belief part of your material environment protects you from having to 
articulate or verify what you believe. Like the Ichimatsu doll that works as a body surrogate for a 
particular person, paraphernalia of a religious origin (ofuda, omamori, hamaya, etc.) act as surrogate 
holders of beliefs. To put it more provocatively, folklorists and anthropologists have sometimes 
misread religiously coded paraphernalia as expressions of belief while in fact they were believing 
surrogates.  
This raises questions about the relationship between religious practice, objects and belief. 
Rather than to conceptualize objects as ‘things to believe with’ that become meaningful through ritual, 
I have argued that they outlive ritual contexts and become substitutes for a general and vague notion 
of belief. But this is only possible because nothing is done to or with them. Contrary to the relational 
view that humans and objects continuously co-construct each other in a smooth dialectical process 
(Miller 2005), a more fine-grained approach shows that for long amounts of time, it is precisely the 
autonomous existence of the object in time and space that allows it to become a substitute. From the 
point of view of the objects, rituals such as the memorial services for inanimate objects change their 
status from personal possessions to ‘waste,’ with the potential to return as commodity, as in case of 
the antique dolls for example. The doll watching the removal of its connection to its owner is acting 
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as a surrogate for the owner removing their connection from the doll. When these rituals are described 
as having a cleansing function (jōka浄化), what the informants pointed towards was the fact the 
matter was cleansed of meaning, thus reinstating the dichotomy between meaning and matter, that has 
become blurred through substitution.  
Finally, if we accept what such a statement would mean, then we can readdress some of the 
debates on whether the Japanese are religious or not. Depending on the perspective of the researcher, 
either the Japanese are entirely secular and for the most part not interested in religion at all (Fitzgerald 
2003; Anderson 1996); or religion is so tightly woven into the fabric of everyday life that almost 
everything can be understood as being inflected by religion (Reader 1991c; Reader and Tanabe 1998). 
Both of these extreme positions are based on a clear distinction between the meanings of the words 
‘secular’ and ‘religious,’ a distinction which is in itself an epistemological artefact of the Western 
history of religious studies and its particular Protestant assumptions (Asad 1993). Talal Asad has 
argued that we should instead aim to describe and understand culturally and historically distinct 
"formations of the secular” (2003). I would add (if such a generalization is permitted) that in the 
particular case of Japanese modernity, what emerges in the post-war years is a formation of the 
secular in which the work of belief has shifted from persons to religious objects, which, in a 
materialist view of the world, have the distinct advantage of being physical presences.  In other words, 
the work of belief is accomplished by religious objects, which goes some way towards explaining the 
confusing and often contradictory attitude towards religion and belief in secular Japan. 
 
References 
 
Ambros, Barbara R. 
2012 Bones of Contention : Animals and Religion in Modern Japan. University of Hawai’i Press. 
Anderson, Richard W.  
1991 What Constitutes Religious Activity? (I). Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 18/4: 369–72. 
Anderson, Richard W. and Elaine Martin. 
1997 “Rethinking the Practice of Mizuko Kuyō in Contemporary Japan: Interviews with 
Practitioners at a Buddhist Temple in Tokyo.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 24/1–2: 
121–43. 
Asad, Talal 
1993 The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category. In Genealogies of Religion: 
Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam, 27–54. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
2003 Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press. 
 22 
Asquith, Pamela J.  
1986 The Monkey Memorial Service of Japanese Primatologists. In Japanese Culture and 
Behavior: Selected Readings, edited by Takie Sugiyama Lebra and William P. Lebra, 29–32. 
Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. 
Bachnik, Jane  
1995 “Orchestrated Reciprocity: Belief versus Practice in Japanese Funeral Ritual.” In Ceremony 
and Ritual in Japan, edited by D. P. Martinez and Jan Van Bremen, 108–45. London: 
Routledge. 
Bond, Kevin  
2014 “Buddhism on the Battlefield: The Cult of the ‘Substitute Body’ Talisman in Imperial Japan 
(1890-1945).” In Material Culture and Asian Religions: Text, Image, Object, edited by 
Benjamin J. Fleming and Richard D. Mann, 120-134. London/New York: Routledge. 
Daniels, Inge Maria  
2003 Scooping, Raking, Beckoning Luck: Luck, Agency and the Interdependence of People and 
Things in Japan. JRAI 9/4: 619–38. 
2009 ‘Dolls Are Scary’: What Constitutes Japanese Religious Activity? In Religion and Material 
Culture: A Matter of Belief, edited by David Morgan, 153–70. London/New York: Routledge. 
2010 The Japanese House: Material Culture in the Modern Home. Oxford: Berg Publishers. 
Dore, Ronald P  
1958 City Life in Japan: A Study of a Tokyo Ward. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Faure, Bernard 
1998 The Buddhist Icon and the Modern Gaze. Critical Inquiry 24/3: 768–813. 
Fitzgerald, Timothy 
2003 ‘Religion’ and ‘the Secular’ in Japan: Problems in History, Social Anthropology, and the 
Study of Religion.” Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies 3/1. 
http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/discussionpapers/Fitzgerald.html#r10. 
Hearn, Lafcadio  
1976 Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan. Rutland and Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company. 
Isomae Jun’ichi  磯前順一 
2012 The Conceptual Formation of the Category ‘Religion’ in Modern Japan: Religion, State and 
Shintō. Journal of Religion in Japan 1/3: 226–45. 
Ikeuchi Hiromi 池内裕美 
2010 Seijin No Animizumu-Teki Shikō - Jihatsuteki Sōshitsu Toshite No Mono-Kuyō No Shinri 成
人のアニミズム的思考—自発的喪失としてのモノ供養の心理 Shakai-Shinri Kenkyū 社
会心理研究 25: 167–77. 
Keane, Webb 
 23 
2005 Signs Are Not the Garb of Meaning: On the Social Analysis of Material Things. In 
Materiality, edited by Daniel Miller, 182–205. Durham NC: Duke University Press. 
Komatsu Kazuhiko 小松和彦 
1998 Fuku no kami to binbō-gami 福の神と貧乏神. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō. 
Kretschmer, Angelika 
2000 Mortuary Rites for Inanimate Objects: The Case of Hari Kuyō. Japanese Journal of Religious 
Studies 27/3–4: 379–404. 
Kyburz, Josef A.  
1991 Des Liens et Des Choses: Engimono et Omocha. L’Homme 31/117, 96-121. 
1994 Things to Play (or Not to Play) with. Asian Folklore Studies 53/1: 1–28. 
Law, Jane Marie 
1997 Puppets of Nostalgia. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Matsuzaki Kenzō 松崎憲三 
1996 Kibutsu no kuyō kenkyū josetsu: Kutsu no kuyō wo chūshin ni 器物の供養研究序説—靴の
供養を中心に. Mingu Kenkyū 民具研究 112: 23–32. 
Miller, Daniel 
2005 Materiality: An Introduction. In Materiality, edited by Daniel Miller, 1-50. Durham, N.C: 
Duke University Press Books. 
Miyata Noboru 宮田登 
1975 Edo no hayari-gami 江戸のはやり神がみ. Chikuma Shobō. 
Morgan, David 
2009 Introduction: The Matter of Belief. In Religion and Material Culture: The Matter of Belief, 
edited by David Morgan, 1–18. London; New York: Routledge. 
Nakamura, Carolyn 
2005 Mastering Matters: Magical Sense and Apotropaic Figurine Worlds of Neo-Assyria. In 
Archaeologies of Materiality, edited by Lynn Meskell. Malden, MA; Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2005. 
Needham, Rodney 
1973 Belief, Language and Experience. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Nelson, John K.  
1996a A Year in the Life of a Shinto Shrine. Seattle: University of Washington Press. 
1996b Freedom of Expression: The Very Modern Practice of Visiting a Shinto Shrine. Japanese 
Journal of Religious Studies 23/1-2: 117–53. 
 Ōsaki Tomoko 大崎智子 
1995 Ueno Kan’eiji Kiyomizu Kannon-dō no ningyō kuyō上野寛永寺清水観音堂の人形供養. 
 24 
Nihon Minzokugaku 日本民俗学 201: 109–19. 
1997 Hasami-kuyō wo megutte: Tokyo-to minato-ku Shiba Zōjōji ハサミ供養をめぐってー東京
都港区芝・増上寺. Mingu Mansurī 民具マンスリー 30/1: 14–24. 
Pate, Alan Scott 
2005 Ningyo: The Art of the Japanese Doll. North Clarendon, Vermont: Tuttle Publishing. 
2008 Japanese Dolls: The Fascinating World of Ningyo by Alan Scott Pate. Tuttle Publishing.  
Rambelli, Fabio 
2001 Vegetal Buddhas: Ideological effects of Japanese Buddhist doctrines on the salvation of 
inanimate beings. Kyoto: Cheng & Tsui. 
2007 Buddhist Materiality: A Cultural History of Objects in Japanese Buddhism. Stanford, Calif: 
Stanford University Press. 
2013 A Buddhist Theory of Semiotics: Signs, Ontology, and Salvation in Japanese Esoteric 
Buddhism. London/New York: Bloomsbury Academic. 
———. Buddhist Materiality: A Cultural History of Objects in Japanese Buddhism. Stanford, Calif: 
Stanford University Press, 2007. 
Reader, Ian 
1991a Letters to the Gods: The Form and Meaning of Ema. Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 
18/1: 23–50. 
1991b Religion in Contemporary Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
1991c What Constitutes Religious Activity? (II). Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 18/4: 373–
76. 
Reader, Ian and George J. Tanabe Jr.  
1998 Practically Religious: Worldly Benefits and the Common Religion of Japan. Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press. 
Reinders, Eric 
2012 Shattered on the Rock of Ages: Western Iconoclasm and Chinese Modernity. In Buddhism 
and Iconoclasm in East Asia: A History, edited by Fabio Rambelli and Eric Reinders, 89–133. 
London: Bloomsbury. 
Robertson, Jennifer 
2008 Ema-Gined Community: Votive Tablets (Ema) and Strategic Ambivalence in Wartime Japan.” 
Asian Ethnology 67/1: 43–77. 
Schattschneider, Ellen 
2001 ‘Buy Me a Bride’: Death and Exchange in Northern Japanese Bride-Doll Marriage. American 
Ethnologist 28/4: 854–80. 
2005 The Bloodstained Doll: Violence and the Gift in Wartime Japan. The Journal of Japanese 
Studies 31: 329–56. 
 25 
Shields, James Mark 
2010 Beyond Belief: Japanese Approaches to the Meaning of Religion. Studies in 
Religion/Sciences Religieuses 39/2: 133–49. 
Smyers, Karen A. 
1996 ‘My Own Inari’: Personalization of the Deity in Inari Worship.” Japanese Journal of 
Religious Studies 23/1: 85–116. 
1998 The Fox and the Jewel: Shared and Private Meanings in Contemporary Japanese Inari 
Worship. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
Sugahara Shinkai 菅原信海 
1996 The Distinctive Features of Sannō Ichijitsu Shinto. Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 
23/1-2: 61–84. 
Sugiyama Lebra, Takie 
1984 Japanese Women: Constraint and Fulfillment. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. 
1994 Migawari: The Cultural Idiom of Self-Other Exchange in Japan. In Self as Person in Asian 
Theory and Practice, edited by Roger T. Ames, Thomas P. Kasulis, and Wimal Dissanayake, 
107–24. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Suzuki Hikaru 鈴木ひかる 
2002 The Price of Death: The Funeral Industry in Contemporary Japan. Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press. 
Swift, Philip 
2010 Cosmetic Cosmologies in Japan: Notes towards a Superficial Investigation.” Open 
Anthropology Cooperative Press Working Paper Series 4. Accessed August 31, 2017. 
http://openanthcoop.net/press/2010/10/09/cosmetic-cosmologies-in-japan/. 
Takeda Dōshō 武田どうしょう and Hoshino Eiki 星野英紀 
1987 Indebtedness and Comfort: The Undercurrents of Mizuko Kuyō in Contemporary Japan. 
Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 14: 305–20. 
Tanaka, Masaru田中正流 
2005 Ningyō-kuyō ni miru ningyōkan no shosō 人形供養にみる人形観の諸相. Ningyō-Gangu 
Kenkyū 人形玩具研究 16: 262–68. 
Tanaka Senichi  田中宣一 
1987 Dōgu no kuyō - Fuyō-dōgu no shobunhō ni miru mingukan 道具の供養—不要道具の処分法
にみる民具観. Mingu Mansurī 民具マンスリー 20: 1–9. 
Taussig, Michael 
1999 Defacement: Public Secrecy and the Labor of the Negative. Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press. 
 26 
Traphagan, John W. 
2004 The Practice of Concern: Ritual, Well-Being, and Aging in Rural Japan. Durham, N.C: 
Carolina Academic Press. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 
1975 Zettel. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Yamagami Izumo山上伊豆母 
1970 ‘Nanase no harai’ no genryū  『七瀬の祓』の源流. Kodai bunka古代文化 22/5: 124-151. 
Yamakage Motohisa 山蔭 基央 
2010 Essence of Shinto: Japan’s Spiritual Heart. Kodansha America, Inc. 
 
 
 
 
 
